



UNIT 10

Fred Korematsu and Japanese Internment

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Fred Korematsu was born in 1919 in Oakland, California, with the given name Toyasoburo. His parents, who were immigrants from Japan, worked growing flowers for sale in San Francisco. Fred, as his American friends called him, worked in the greenhouses with them. Fred graduated from high school in 1938, and after struggling to make a living on his own, he returned to the family business for the next two years.

With the outbreak of war after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Fred tried to enlist in the U.S. Army; he was rejected due to his ancestry. Fred then took jobs as a welder, but was quickly fired from them, again due to his Japanese heritage. After President Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066, General Dewitt began the mass removal of Japanese Americans from the west coast on the basis of the "threat" they posed to national security. The army ordered the Korematsu family to report to an internment camp, but Fred wished to remain with Ida Boitano, his fiancée. He made plans to leave California to avoid internment. While waiting to leave with Ida, he was arrested and charged with violating the order to evacuate.

After Ernest Besig, a lawyer with the ACLU (American Civil Liberties Union), posted his bail, the military police arrested him again. They brought him to the intern-

ment facility at Tanforan, where the rest of his family was located. Fred took his case to trial, but was found guilty of violating the order. He was sentenced to probation. This effectively returned him to Tanforan, as he planned to appeal the case to a higher court. While waiting for his appeal, Fred and other "disruptive" prisoners were moved to the Topaz camp, in a remote area of Nevada. After the appeals court denied his appeal, the ACLU took his case to the Supreme Court. By this time, 1944, *nisei*, Americans born to Japanese parents, were allowed to leave the camps to work. Fred left for Salt Lake City, and then Detroit. In December of 1944, the Supreme Court denied Fred's appeal, citing the military necessity of the evacuation order.

With the end of the war in late 1945, the detention centers were closed. Fred was married in 1946 to Kathryn Pearson, and they moved back to California in 1950. In 1982 an attorney named Peter Irons uncovered documents suggesting that the government had suppressed evidence that might have helped Fred in his case. They again brought the case before the district court in San Francisco, and the court exonerated Fred Korematsu in a 1984 decision.

Key Questions About This Subject

- Why were Americans of Japanese descent treated differently on the West Coast during World War II than Americans of German and Italian descent were treated on the East Coast?
- Under what, if any, circumstances is the government justified in abridging the due process rights of individual citizens?*

Mock Trial

If you are going to hold a simulated trial, here are the charges against Fred Korematsu (the Defendant): Fred (Toyasoburo) Korematsu is accused of violating Public Law 503, codifying Executive Order 9066 (the wartime exclusion act), providing for the removal of any or all civilians from designated military zones.

* Title II of the McCarran Internal Security Act of 1950 authorized the President, in the event of invasion, insurrection, or war, to declare an "internal security emergency" during which the attorney general could order the detention, without due process, of anyone deemed a potential threat. This act was never applied to any individuals, though camps for this purpose (including some originally for the Japanese internment) were maintained. The act was repealed in 1971.

DOCUMENTS

Document A

Act of Congress

(From 56 Stat. 173, 18 U.S.C.A. 97a. Seventy-seventh Congress of the United States of America, January 5, 1942.)

An Act

To provide a penalty for violation of restrictions or orders with respect to persons entering, remaining in, leaving, or committing any act in military areas or zones.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That whoever shall enter, remain in, leave, or commit any act in any military area or military zone prescribed, under the authority of an Executive order of the President, by the Secretary of War, or by any military commander designated by the Secretary of War, contrary to the restrictions applicable to any such area or zone or contrary to the order of the Secretary of War or any such military commander, shall, if it ap-

pears that he knew or should have known of the existence and extent of the restrictions or order and that his act was in violation thereof, be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be liable to a fine of not to exceed \$5,000 or to imprisonment for not more than one year, or both, for each offense.

Sam Rayburn
Speaker of the House of Representatives

Carter Glass
President of the Senate pro tempore

Franklin D. Roosevelt

Document B

Executive Order 9066

(Authorizing the Secretary of War to prescribe military areas.)

WHERE AS the successful prosecution of the war requires every possible protection against espionage and against sabotage to national-defense material, national-defense premises, and national-defense utilities as defined in section 4, Act of April 20, 1918, 40 Stat. 533, as amended by the act of November 30, 1940, 54 Stat. 1220, and the Act of August 21, 1941, 55 Stat. 655 (U.S.C., Title 50, Sec. 104):

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States, and Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, I hereby authorize and direct the Secretary of War, and the Military Commanders whom he may from time to time designate, whenever he or any designated Commander deems such actions necessary or desirable, to prescribe military areas in such places and of such extent as he or the appropriate Military Commanders may determine, from which any or all persons may be excluded, and with such respect to which, the right of any person to enter, remain in, or leave shall be subject to whatever restrictions the Secretary of War or the appropriate Military Commander may impose in his discretion. The Secretary of War is hereby authorized to provide for residents of any such area who are excluded therefrom, such transportation, food, shelter, and other accommodations as may be necessary, in the judgement of the Secretary of War or the said Military Commander, and until other arrangements are made, to accomplish the purpose of this order. . . .

I hereby further authorize and direct all Executive Departments, independent establishments and other Federal Agencies, to assist the Secretary of War or the said Military Commanders in carrying out this Executive Order, including the furnishing of medical aid, hospi-

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talization, food, clothing, transportation, use of land, shelter, and other supplies, equipment, utilities, facilities, and services . . .

This order shall not be construed as modifying or limiting in any way the authority heretofore granted under Executive Order No. 8972, dated December 12, 1941, nor shall it be construed as limiting or modifying the duty and responsibility of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with respect to the investigation of alleged acts of sabotage or the duty and responsibility of the Attorney General and the Department of Justice under the Proclamations of December 7 and 8, 1941, prescribing regulations for the conduct and control of alien enemies, except as such duty and responsibility is superseded by the designation of military areas there under.

Franklin D. Roosevelt
February 19, 1942

Document C

Civilian Exclusion Order No. 27

Headquarters Western Defense Command and Fourth Army Presidio of San Francisco, California, April 30, 1942.*

1. Pursuant to the provisions of Public Proclamations Nos. 1 and 2, this Headquarters, dated March 2, 1942, and March 16, 1942, respectively, it is hereby ordered that from and after 12 o'clock noon, P.W.T., of Thursday, May 7, 1942, all persons of Japanese ancestry, both alien and non-alien, be excluded from that portion of Military Area No. I described as follows:

All of that portion of the County of Alameda, State of California, within that boundary beginning at the point at which the southerly limits of the City of Berkeley meet San Francisco Bay; thence easterly and following the southerly limits of said city to College Avenue; thence southerly on College Avenue to Broadway; thence southerly on Broadway to the southerly limits of the City of Oakland; thence following the limits of said city westerly and northerly, and following the shoreline of San Francisco Bay to the point of beginning.

2. A responsible member of each family, and each individual living alone, in the above described area will report between the hours of 8:00 A.M. and 5:00 P.M., Friday, May 1, 1942, or during the same hours on Saturday, May 2, 1942, to the Civil Control Station located at:
530 Eighteenth Street
Oakland, California.
3. Any person subject to this order who fails to comply with any of its provisions or with the provisions of published instructions pertaining hereto or who is found in the above area after

* Similar orders were issued in areas throughout the west coast of the United States.

12 o'clock noon, P.W.T., of Thursday, May 7, 1942 will be liable to the criminal penalties provided by Public Law No. 503, 77th Congress, approved March 21, 1942 entitled "An Act to Provide a Penalty for Violation of Restrictions or Orders with Respect to Persons Entering, Remaining in, Leaving, or Committing any Act in Military Areas or Zones," and alien Japanese will be subject to immediate apprehension and internment.

4. All persons within the bounds of an established Assembly Center pursuant to instructions from this Headquarters are excepted from the provisions of this order while those persons are in such Assembly Center.

J.L. DeWitt
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army
Commanding

Document D

Internment Instructions

Western Defense Command and Fourth Army Wartime Civil Control Administration. Presidio of San Francisco, California. Instructions to all persons of Japanese Ancestry living in the following area:

All of that portion of the County of Alameda, State of California, within that boundary beginning at the point at which the southerly limits of the City of Berkeley meet San Francisco Bay; thence easterly and following the southerly limits of said city to College Avenue; thence southerly on College Avenue to Broadway; thence southerly on Broadway to the southerly limits of the City of Oakland; thence following the limits of said city westerly and northerly, and following the shoreline of San Francisco Bay to the point of beginning.

Pursuant to the provisions of Civilian Exclusion Order No. 27, this Headquarters, dated April 30, 1942, all persons of Japanese ancestry, both alien and non-alien, will be evacuated from the above area by 12 o'clock noon, P.W.T., Thursday May 7, 1942.

No Japanese person living in the above area will be permitted to change residence after 12 o'clock noon, P.W.T., Thursday, April 30, 1942, without obtaining special permission from the representative of the Commanding General, Northern California Sector, at the Civil Control Station located at:

530 Eighteenth Street,
Oakland, California.

Such permits will only be granted for the purpose of uniting members of a family, or in cases of grave emergency.

The Civil Control Station is equipped to assist the Japanese population affected by this evacuation in the following ways:

1. Give advice and instructions on the evacuation.
2. Provide services with respect to the management, leasing, sale, storage or other disposition of most kinds of property, such as real estate, business and professional equipment, household goods, boats, automobiles and livestock.
3. Provide temporary residence elsewhere for all Japanese in family groups.
4. Transport persons and a limited amount of clothing and equipment to their new residence.

Document E

Confidential War Office Memo

War Relocation Authority
Washington

August 12, 1942

RELOCATION AND THE CONSTITUTION

Prepared by the Office of the Solicitor and the Office of
Reports for use of the War Relocation Authority Staff

Confidential Confidential Confidential

When Uncle Sam last March ordered 112,000 people of Japanese ancestry to pack up and move out of military areas on the Pacific coast his action generated a storm of discussion and raises some legal questions of fundamental importance to the American people.

It was the first time in the history of the United States that anything like that had ever been done. True, the military dictators of Europe could have taken such action with no questions asked, but in a democracy—well, that was a different matter.

In the first place, two-thirds of the Japanese people in this country were born here and are therefore citizens—with the same rights as any of the rest of us. Where then, did the Federal Government get its legal authority to uproot a whole people and transplant them? What basis could be found in the Constitution for such action? Did it mean that the Bill of Rights was also to be scrapped for the duration?

There is no pat answer for these questions nor can they be considered from the standpoint of what would have been right and just ten years ago, or even one year ago when this country was not at war. They must be considered against the backdrop of total war, and from the standpoint of a nation fighting for its existence. . . .

The main constitutional problem centers around detaining American citizens of Japanese ancestry. Under sweeping war-time powers, the Federal Government can order the detention, or place other restriction upon ANY citizen—so long as such restrictions are justified, reasonable and necessary in the protection of national safety and in the preservation of national existence. That does not mean, however, the Government can set aside the Bill of Rights to suit its convenience. Every citizen still has redress to the courts. Every citizen still retains the rights guaranteed him by the Bill of Rights—but those rights may be curtailed in time of war to protect the national safety.

So the constitutional question simmers down to this: Can it be shown that the detention of citizen-Japanese at relocation centers is a reasonable and necessary step for the protection of national safety?

How the courts will answer that question is as yet undetermined, but here, in broad outline, are the defense positions the Federal Government will take in the event the legality of its evacuation and relocation program is challenged:

The action taken with respect to Japanese in this country is justifiable on the grounds of military necessity for several reasons.

1. All Japanese look very much alike to a white person—it is hard for us to distinguish between them. It would be hard to tell a Japanese soldier in disguise from a resident Japanese. The danger of infiltration by Japanese parachutists, soldiers, etc. is, therefore, reduced and the chances of detecting any attempt at infiltration are increased.
2. The Japanese Government has always tried to maintain close ties with and control over Japanese people in this country with the result that many of them have never really been absorbed into American life and culture. Many Japanese-Americans have been educated in Japan. Many, believers in Shintoism, worship the Emperor and regard his orders as superior to any loyalty they may owe the United States. Therefore, the action has reduced the danger of successful invasion by removing an element of the population which had never been assimilated and which might not successfully withstand the strong-emotional impulse to change loyalties or give way to their true feelings in the event that Japanese troops should land on our shores.
3. Evacuation and limited detention of the Japanese is justified as a measure in the prevention of sabotage and fifth-column* activities. We know that there is a Japanese fifth-column in this country but nobody knows who is in it or how large it is. Some members of it have been caught and, after a hearing, interned. Since it is impossible for us to distinguish between the loyal and the disloyal Japanese, we may avoid the danger of fifth-column activity, sabotage and espionage by removing all Japanese from the danger zones and detaining them in other places.
4. In time of war the judgment of the military authorities is entitled to great weight and should not be lightly pushed aside. Since they have decided that evacuation and detention of the Japanese is a necessary precaution in fighting this war their judgment should stand unless it is proved wrong.
5. The action taken was reasonable and necessary for the protection of the Japanese themselves. It minimized the dangers of mob violence and local disorders growing out of war hysteria and racial discrimination. Through lessening the possibility of harsh treatment of

* Relating to a group of citizens or residents of the country who are enemy sympathizers engaging in spying or sabotage within national borders.

Japanese in this country (incidents which would have been exploited promptly by Axis propagandists who wish to make it appear to be a race war) it took away an excuse for even harsher retaliatory treatment of American prisoners by Japan.

Since its creation by Executive Order of the President on March 18, 1942, as the agency charged with the responsibility of relocating the Japanese after their evacuation, the War Relocation Authority has taken steps to strengthen its position on the constitutional question by the adoption of administrative procedures to relax regulations and permit citizen-Japanese to leave relocation centers to accept employment under certain specified conditions. These procedures will change an absolute detention into a qualified detention and will therefore strengthen the reasonableness of the action.

Document F

Personal Narrative

Chieko Hirata [Teacher]
Period II, English I

My Last Day At Home

The month of May when I was attending school, all the residents of Hood River county, as well as the people of the whole western coast was surprised to receive such an unexpected order of evacuation.

Promptly after hearing about the order I with my folks went to register and then for a brief physical examination. Then I helped my folks pack and prepared to leave my dear home on May 13, 1942.

On May 8, 1942 I withdrew from Parkdale Grade School, where all my friends and teachers bid me farewell with sorrowful face and tears. Our packing never seem to cease, we kept on packing then finally we were finished. Then came May 13th, my most dreaded day which I shall never forget the rest of my life. On the afternoon of the 13th, I board the train headed for Pinedale, California.

On the night of the 15th we arrived. The weather was pretty hot. In Pinedale I lived in the D-section which had forty barracks, which had [five] apartments to a barrack.

I stayed at the Pinedale Assembly Center about two months. Then around July 15, 1942 we received our order to evacuate for Tule Lake. Then on July 18th we evacuated for Tule Lake and spent a night on the train. I arrived in Tule Lake. At present I am living in Block 58. The residents of this block is most Tacoma folks which I am not very much acquainted with as yet. Being that my cousin lives in Block 57 I am always visiting them.

I am always hoping that this war will end, so that I will be able to go back to Parkdale, my home town and see all my old friends, and live to my dying days in my old home in Parkdale, Oregon.

—Herbert Yoshikawa [Student Author]

Document G

Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 1943

Hir[a]bayashi, an American citizen of Japanese ancestry, was convicted in the district court of knowingly disregarding restrictions made applicable by a military commander to persons in a military area prescribed by him as such, all as authorized by an Executive Order of the President. The questions before the court was whether the particular restriction violated, namely that all persons of Japanese ancestry residing in such an area be within their place of residence daily between the hours of 8:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m., was adopted by the military commander in the exercise of an unconstitutional delegation by Congress of its legislative power, and whether the restriction unconstitutionally discriminated between citizens of Japanese ancestry and those of other ancestries in violation of the Fifth Amendment. . . . There is support for the view that social, economic and political conditions which have prevailed since the close of the last century, when the Japanese began to come to this country in substantial numbers, have intensified their solidarity and have in large measure prevented their assimilation as an integral part of the white population. . . . Congress and the Executive, including the military commander, could have attributed special significance, in its bearing on the loyalties of persons of Japanese descent, to the maintenance by Japan of its system of dual citizenship. . . . The restrictions, both practical and legal, affecting the privileges and opportunities afforded to persons of Japanese extraction residing in the United States, have been sources of irritation and may well have tended to increase their isolation, and in many instances their attachments to Japan and its institutions.

Viewing these data in all their aspects, Congress and the Executive could reasonably have concluded that these conditions have encouraged the continued attachment of members of this group to Japan and Japanese institutions. . . . We cannot say that the war-making branches of the Government did not have ground for believing that in a critical hour such persons could not readily be isolated and separately dealt with, and constituted a menace to the national defense and safety, which demanded that prompt and adequate measures be taken to guard against it. . . . Distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality. For that reason, legislative classification or discrimination based on race alone has often been held to be a denial of equal protection. . . . We may assume that these considerations would be controlling here were it not for the fact that the danger of espionage and sabotage, in time of war and of threatened invasion, calls upon the military authorities to scrutinize every relevant fact bearing on the loyalty of populations in the danger areas. . . . The adoption by Government, in the crisis of war and of threatened invasion, of measures for the public safety, based upon the recognition of facts and circumstances which indicate that a group of one national extraction may menace that safety more than others, is not wholly beyond the limits of the Constitution and is not to be condemned merely because in other and in most circumstances racial distinctions are irrelevant. . . . What we have said also disposes of the contention that the curfew order involved an unlawful delegation by Congress of its legislative power. . . . Affirmed.

Document H

Yasui v. United States, 320 U.S. 115, 1943

Yasui, an American-born person of Japanese ancestry, was convicted in the district court of an offense of a curfew order. Evidence presented at trial showed that Yasui was born in Oregon in 1916 of alien parents; when he was eight years old he spent a summer in Japan; he attended the public schools in Oregon, and also, for about three years, a Japanese language school; he later attended the University of Oregon, from which he received A.B and LL.B degrees; he was a member of the bar of Oregon, and a second lieutenant in the Army of the United States, Infantry Reserve; he had been employed by the Japanese Consulate in Chicago, but had resigned on December 8, 1941, and immediately offered his services to the military authorities; he had discussed with an agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation the advisability of testing the constitutionality of the curfew; and that when he violated the curfew order he requested that he be arrested so that he could test its constitutionality.

. . . [We] hold, as in the *Hirabayashi* case, that the curfew order was valid as applied to citizens. . . and the conviction must be sustained. . . But as the sentence of one year's imprisonment—the maximum permitted by the state—was imposed after the finding that appellant was not a citizen, and as the Government states that it has not and does not now controvert his citizenship, the case is an appropriate one for resentence in the light of these circumstances. . . The conviction will be sustained but the judgment will be vacated and the cause remanded to the district court for resentence . . . and to afford that court opportunity to strike its findings as to appellant's loss of United States citizenship.

Document I

Endo, Ex Parte 323, U.S. 283, 1944

Mitsuye Endo, an American citizen, had been granted leave clearance by the War Relocation Authority, but the Western Defense Command would not allow her to re-enter the restricted zone. The Supreme Court, the Court ruled that a loyal American citizen could not be held in a relocation camp against her will.

A citizen who is concededly loyal presents no problem of espionage or sabotage. Loyalty is a matter of the heart and mind not of race, creed, or color. He who is loyal is by definition not a spy or a saboteur. When the power to detain is derived from the power to protect the war effort against espionage and sabotage, detention which has no relationship to that objective is unauthorized.

Nor may the power to detain an admittedly loyal citizen or to grant him a conditional release be implied as a useful or convenient step in the evacuation program, whatever authority might be implied in case of those whose loyalty was not conceded or established. If we assume (as we do) that the original evacuation was justified, its lawful character was derived from the fact that it was an espionage and sabotage measure, not that there was community hostility to this group of American citizens. The evacuation program rested explicitly on the former ground not on the latter as the underlying legislation shows. The authority to detain a citizen or to

grant him a conditional release as protection against espionage or sabotage is exhausted at least when his loyalty is conceded. . . . Community hostility even to loyal evacuees may have been (and perhaps still is) a serious problem. But if authority for their custody and supervision is to be sought on that ground, the Act of March 21, 1942, offer no support. And none other is advanced. To read them that broadly would be to assume that the Congress and the President intended that this discriminatory action should be taken against these people wholly on account of their ancestry even though the government conceded their loyalty to this country. We cannot make such an assumption. As the President has said of these loyal citizens: 'Americans of Japanese ancestry, like those of many other ancestries, have shown that they can, and want to, accept our institutions and work loyally with the rest of us, making their own valuable contribution to the national wealth and well-being. In vindication of the very ideals for which we are fighting this war it is important to us to maintain a high standard of fair, considerate, and equal treatment for the people of this minority as of all other minorities.' Mitsuye Endo is entitled to an unconditional release by the War Relocation Authority.

Document J

Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 1944

Fred Korematsu was arrested and convicted for not reporting to an assembly center in May 1942 . . . was convicted in a federal district court for remaining in San Leandro, California, a 'Military Area,' contrary to Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34 of the Commanding General [323 U.S. 214, 216] of the Western Command, U.S. Army, which directed that after May 9, 1942, all persons of Japanese ancestry should be excluded from that area. No question was raised as to petitioner's loyalty to the United States. . . . It should be noted, to begin with, that all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all such restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny. Pressing public necessity may sometimes justify the existence of such restrictions; racial antagonism never can. . . . In the light of the principles we announced in the *Hirabayashi* case, we are unable to conclude that it was beyond the war power of Congress and the Executive to exclude those of Japanese ancestry from the West Coast war area at the time they did. . . . They did so, as pointed out in our *Hirabayashi* opinion, in accordance with Congressional authority to the military to say who should, and who should not, remain in the threatened areas. Here, as in the *Hirabayashi* case, . . . we cannot reject as unfounded the judgment of the military authorities and of Congress that there were disloyal members of that population, whose number and strength could not be precisely and quickly ascertained. . . . [We] uphold the exclusion order as of the time it was made and when the petitioner violated it. . . . It is said that we are dealing here with the case of imprisonment of a citizen in a concentration camp solely because of his ancestry, without evidence or inquiry concerning his loyalty and good disposition towards the United States. Our task would be simple, our duty clear, were this a case involving the imprisonment of a loyal citizen in a concentration camp because of racial prejudice. Regard-

less of the true nature of the assembly and relocation centers—and we deem it unjustifiable to call them concentration camps with all the ugly connotations that term implies—we are dealing specifically with nothing but an exclusion order. To cast this case into outlines of racial prejudice, without reference to the real military dangers which were presented, merely confuses the issue. Korematsu was not excluded from the Military Area because of hostility to him or his race. He was excluded because we are at war with the Japanese Empire, because the properly constituted military authorities feared an invasion of our West Coast and felt constrained to take proper security measures, because they decided that the military urgency of the situation demanded that all citizens of Japanese ancestry be segregated from the West Coast temporarily, and finally, because Congress, reposing its confidence in this time of war in our military leaders—as inevitably it must—determined that they should have the power to do just this. There was evidence of disloyalty on the part of some, the military authorities considered that the need for action was great, and time was short. We cannot—by availing ourselves of the calm perspective of hindsight—now say that at that time these actions were unjustified. Affirmed.

Document K

Civil Liberties Act of 1988

(From "Restitution for World War II Internment of Japanese-Americans and Aleuts," 50 App. USCA 5 1989, Pub. L. 100-383, Sec. 1, August 10, 1988, 102 Stat. 903.)

The purpose of this Act (sections 1989 to 1989d of this Appendix) are to—

- (1) acknowledge the fundamental injustice of the evacuation, relocation, and internment of United States citizens and permanent resident aliens of Japanese ancestry during World War II;
- (2) apologize on behalf of the people of the United States for the evacuation, relocation, and internment of such citizens and permanent resident aliens;
- (3) provide for a public education fund to finance efforts to inform the public about the internment of such individuals so as to prevent the recurrence of any similar event;
- (4) make restitution to those individuals of Japanese ancestry who were interned;
- (5) make restitution to Aleut residents of the Pribilof Islands and the Aleutian Islands west of Unimak Island, in settlement of United States obligations in equity and at law, for—
 - (A) injustices suffered and unreasonable hardships endured while those Aleut residents were under United States control during World War II;
 - (B) personal property taken or destroyed by United States forces during World War II;
 - (C) community property, including community church property, taken or destroyed by United States forces during World War II; and
 - (D) traditional village lands on Attu Island not rehabilitated after World War II for Aleut occupation or other productive use;
- (6) discourage the occurrence of similar injustices and violations of civil liberties in the future; and
- (7) make more credible and sincere any declaration of concern by the United States over violations of human rights committed by other nations.

Bill of Rights of the United States of America (1791)

The Bill of Rights – Full Text

Amendment I

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.

Amendment II

A well regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed.

Amendment III

No soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.

Amendment IV

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Amendment V

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.

Amendment VI

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.

Amendment VII

In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.

Amendment VIII

Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.

Amendment IX

The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.

Amendment X

The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.